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During the last twenty-five years the courts with increasing fre-
quency have been called upon to decide where the law ought to place
the loss when a bank pays a forged check and charges it to the account
of a depositor, believing that he drew the check as presented. The
broad statement that a bank pays a check at its peril is so frequently met
with that it is likely to make the impression that a depositor enjoys an
immunity from change in his legal relations to the bank, save as the
bank pays checks. 'that are in fact his orders. It is well settled, how-
ever, that the failure of a depositor to notify his bank after he knows,
or ought to know, that it has paid a forged check and charged it to his
account, will, under some circumstances, result in undesirable financial
consequence to him, though its extent, as well as the basis upon which
it is imposed, are matters about which there is a variety of judicial
opinion. It is proposed to examine herein the broad principle referred
to above and seek to ascertain when and to what extent the depositor's
conduct subsequent to payment affects his legal relations to the bank.
In most of the cases that raise the question referred to, there has been
a series of forgeries by some dishonest clerk. He may have executed
the forgeries so skilfully or he may have so manipulated his employer's
books of account that his wrongdoing has extended over a considerable
period without detection. Or the forgeries may have been such that
a careful examination of the pass-book' or monthly statement and
vouchers would have resulted in their detection, but the depositor
has either failed to make such an examination or unwittingly con-
fided it to the dishonest clerk. Or, again, the depositor may even
have acquired actual knowledge of the forgeries from an examina-
tion of his statement and vouchers or otherwise, and yet he may
have wilfully or negligently failed promptly to notify the bank of the
forgery. In any of these situations, when the depositor demands that
the bank pay him his balance, alleging it to include the amounts of the
The use of the pass-book, which is referred to in many of the earlier cases,
for any purpose other than as a record of deposits is now very generally discon-
tinued. It was once the custom for the depositor to bring in his pass-book when-
ever he wished a statement of his account. Checks charged to him would then
be entered, his balance ascertained and the book, together with the checks so
charged, returned. The present practice is to send to the depositor a statement at
the end of each month, showing his credits and debits, together with his cancelled
checks.
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forged checks charged to him, the courts are required to determine
what effect, if any, his conduct has upon his right to recover the balance
claimied to be due, and this they are generally required to do in the
very action in which the depositor demands judgment.2 Almost unani-
mously, in the cases that have arisen so far in this country, the courts
have disapproved of the depositor's departure from that standard of
conduct usually adhered to by ordinary business men under similar cir-
cumstances.8 Though the disapproval of the various courts, as shown
by the undesirable financial consequence visited upon the remiss
depositor, has varied in extent, there has not been as much variety of
opinion in this respect as in the theories by which the courts have
accounted for their conclusions.
In order that a comparison may be made of the views, in these
respects, of the different courts in such cases, suppose a series of
forgeries to have been perpetrated and to have extended over several
months of time before discovery, the bank having returned regularly
each month to the depositor his cancelled checks with a statement of
account. Let the problem be considered, first, with reference to checks
paid and returned with the first monthly statement received by the
'This fact has at times led to the supposition that the bank's claim for the
injury caused it by the depositor's failure to give prompt notice must necessarily
be adjudicated in the action which the depositor brings to recover his balance.
For example, in criticizing the rule laid down in Critten v. Chemical National
Bank (89o2) 171 N. Y. 219, 63 N. E. 969, it was said: "But such a decision while,
perhaps, fair enough in the particular circumstances of this case, might easily
lead to awkward results. The direct effect would be to have the Court determin-
ing the actual obligations of the parties before it, by the possible obligations of
third parties not represented, and liquidating the damages in one action by a
claim wholly unliquidated, and, perhaps, never to be enforced or even put forward
by another." Chipman, The Pass-Book and Forgery (i9o8) 28 CAN. L. TIMES &
REV. 527, 534.
This criticism assumes that the bank must use its claim to repel that of the
depositor, whereas it is merely privileged to do so. That a separate action may
be brought by the bank has been recognized. In Leather Manufacturer's Bank v.
Morgan (1885) I17 U. S. 96, II5, 6 Sup. Ct. 657, 665, it was said: "An inquiry
as to the damages in money actually sustained by the bank, by reason of the
neglect of the depositor to give notice of the forgeries, might be proper if this
were an action by it to recover damages for a violation of his duty." See also
the well-known dictum of Cockburn, C. J., in Swan v. North British Australasian
Co. (1863, Exch. Ch.) 2 Hurl. & Colt. 175, I88, which was approved in Guardians
of Halifaz Union v. Wheelwright (1875) L. R. io Exch. 183, 192; Greenfield
Savings Bank v. Stowell (1877) 123 Mass. 196, 2Ol; and Mechanics National
Bank v. Harter (1899) 63 N. J. L. 578, 582, 44 At. 715, 716.
'In England, it seems that the depositor may omit to examine his pass-book or
monthly statement with impunity. Walker v. Manchester & Liverpool District
Banking Co (913, K. B.) 29 T. L. R. 492. See also Kepitigalla Rubber Estates,
Ltd. v. National Bank of India [19o9] 2 K. B. ioio; Lewes Sanitary Steam
Laundry Co., Ltd. v. Barclay & Co., Ltd. (i9o6, K.B.) 95 L. T. R. 444.
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depositor after the forgeries began and, secondly, as to checks similarly
and subsequently forged.4
I
The undertaking of the bank is to pay according to the depositor's
order to the extent of his balance. When a valid check is presented to
the bank for payment, there is created a power in the bank to change
its legal relations with its depositor by paying the check. Such pay-
ment has as its legal consequence the satisfaction pro tanto of the bank's
indebtedness. All the courts agree that, assuming the depositor to have
done nothing to lead the bank reasonably to believe that a forged check
is genuine and otherwise to have acted prudently, the payment of a
forged check does not operate to decrease the bank's indebtedness.5
The depositor under such circumstances had done no act intended to
result in a power in the bank to decrease its indebtedness nor does jus-
tice require that the same legal result should follow as if an act had
been done by the depositor for such a purpose. 6 If nothing else should
ever happen, it would be correct to say that "the bank pays at its peril."
But this is usually not the whole story. In the typical case, the bank
sends to the depositor a statement of his account with the cancelled
checks, assumed by it to have been drawn by him for the purpose of
conferring upon it a power, which it claims to have exercised with the
result shown by the statement of account. The depositor then omits
'To the present writer it seems clear that the bank's claim to credit for pay-
ments made under such circumstances rests, with reference to each class of
checks, on distinctly different grounds and that each class of payments calls for
the application of a different principle. It is often supposed, however, that the
basis of the court's conclusion in each class of forgeries is the same. See Chip-
man, op. cit., supra note 2; Walker v. Manchester & Liverpool District Banking
Co., supra note 31 Lewes Sanitary Steam Laundry Co. Ltd. v. Barclay & Co.
Ltd., supra note 3; Myers v. Southwestern Nationl Bank (1899) 193 Pa. 1, 44 Atl.
280; Weinstein v. National Bank of Jefferson (1887) 69 Tex. 38, 6 S. W. 171;
Leather Manufacturer's Bank v. Morgan, supra note 2; First National Bank of
Richmond v. Richmond Electric Co. (19o7) io6 Va. 347, 56 S. E. 152; Hardy &
Bros. v. Chesapeake Bank (1879) 51 Md. 562; McNeeley Co. v. Batk of North
America (19o8) 221 Pa. 588, 7o Atl. 891.
'2 Morse, Banks and Banking (5th ed. 1917) 97; see Hardy & Bros. v. Chesa-
peake Bank, supra note 4, at p. 586. But if the forgery consists in raising a check
and the payee actually gets the amount originally called for, the bank is protected
to that extent. See National Bank of Commerce v. Tacoma Mill Co. (1910,
C. C. A. 9th) 182 Fed. i. Cf. Shipman v. Bank of the State of New York (1891)
126 N. Y. 318, 331, 27 N. E. 371, 374.
'But where the plaintiff signed checks and left them in his book to be used in
his absence and a stranger, who was permitted to write a letter at his desk, stole
several checks, filled them out and overdrew the plaintiff's account, it was held,
in an action to recover a balance claimed, that the plaintiff must pay the overdraft.
Allen Grocery Company v. Bank of Buchanan County (1916) 192 Mo. App. 476,
182 S. W. 777.
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to examine the statement or, having examined it and having discovered
the forgeries, he fails within a reasonable time to notify the bank that
it has erroneously charged checks to his account. But he demands that
the bank be required to pay him his balance and that no deduction
from his claim be made because of the payment of the forged checks or
because of his conduct in the premises, contending that the bank was
under a duty to him to pay according to his order, that the credits which
it claims are for payments made otherwise, and that he was under no
duty to the bank to give notice that such payments were made without
authorization. The bank, on the other hand, maintains that his con-
duct has not been such as was to be expected of a reasonably prudent
man under the circumstances and that it was his duty so to conduct
himself in the premises as to give to it the largest possible chance to
retrieve the loss incident to an innocent error. Under these circum-
stances, the depositor's conduct meets with the approval of no American
court. While unanimously admitting that the facts which have hap-
pened up to the time when the bank charges the forged check to the
depositor's account do not alone suffice to cause those changes of legal
relation, which we may shortly characterize as a pro tanto decrease of
the bank's indebtedness, all the courts in this country agree that when
the depositor acquires, or is chargeable with, knowledge of those facts,
there results, as a legal consequence, a new relation, which the courts
say is a "duty" to notify the bank promptly. Some courts view this
so-called duty of the depositor to give notice quite apart from his other
relations to the bank and have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion
that he is charged with, or must pay, such a sum as will recompense
the bank for whatever injury it has sustained as the proximate result
of his failure to give notice and the bank is allowed an offset against
the depositor's claim to the extent of the losses so resulting to the bank.
Others, to whom the well-known doctrines of ratification, adoption, and
estoppel are suggested, apply one of these terms to the depositor's con-
duct and, with its mere name, they conjure the conclusion that the
indebtedness of the bank has been reduced to the extent of the forged
checks paid.
Before discussing these varying views of the courts, it is worth
while to notice some of the language which they have used in the
leading cases.
The Supreme Court of Alabama in the case of First National Bank v.
Allen,7 a suit by a depositor against the bank to recover an amount
equal to a series of forged checks charged to the plaintiff, said, with
reference to the class of checks which we are now considering:
"The depositor owed the bank a duty which was to examine the pass
book and vouchers with reasonable care and diligence. If the deposi-
1 (1893) ioo Ala. 476, 485, 14 So. 335, 337.
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tor failed in his duty in this respect, and the bank was injured in con-
sequence of such omission of duty, the depositor becomes liable to the
bank for all such damages. The extent of the liability of the depositor
is commensurate with the loss sustained in consequence of his neglect of
duty; no more, no less. It would be unjust, unfair to the depositor, not
sanctioned by any correct principle of -law, to permit the bank to invoke
the doctrine of ratification or estoppel, which would exempt the bank
from all liability incurred by its own neglect in the payment of the
forged check, and in many cases inflict on the depositor a greater loss
than that caused to the bank by his neglect of duty. The damages
sustained by the bank as a result of neglect of duty by the depositor are
as susceptible of proof and measurement as arise in any other case of
breach of duty imposed by contract."
The Supreme Court of New York in a later case,8 involving a pre-
cisely similar situation, approved the reasoning of the Alabama Court,
saying:
"We see no reason why the bank should be entitled to anything more
than indemnity for the loss the depositor's negligence has caused it."
In De Feriet v. Bank of America,9 a depositor sought to recover a
balance alleged to be due him. It appeared that a $2,500 check had been
forged and paid by the bank and that the depositor had learned of the
facts but had given the bank no notice. Six months later a similarly
forged check for $1,7oo was paid, which overdrew the plaintiff's account
$1,774.59. The plaintiff's suit was based on the assumptioh that the
bank was entitled to no credit for payment of either check. The bank
denied any indebtedness whatever to the depositor and claimed judg-
ment for the amount of the overdraft. The court held that the bank
was entitled to judgment, saying, with reference to the first forged
check:
"Under these circumstances, it is clear that the plaintiff cannot be
heard to disavow the check for $2,50 ..... .... So far as was in his
power he condoned this offense of his bookkeeper, and made the trans-
action his own."
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts had the same question pre-
sented for decision in the case of Dana v. National Bank of the Repub-
lic,'0 an action by a depositor against a bank to recover a balance, where
a clerk had fraudulently erased the name of the payee of a check drawn
by the plaintiff, made it payable to bearer and himself received payment
from the bank on November 20, 1874. The bank returned this check
with a statement of account on the first of December following, and the
Critten v. Chemical Natio l Bank (1902) 171 N. Y. 219, 229, 63 N. E. 969,
972. See approving note (19o2) 2 CoL. L. REv. 490.
* (1871) 23 La. Ann. 310, 311.
'0 (1882) 132 Mass. 156, i59.
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balance shown by a statement rendered the first of the following
January was drawn out during that month and the account closed.
The plaintiff gave no notice of the forgery until twenty-three months
after the check was paid. The dishonest clerk had been entrusted with
the examination of the statement of account and vouchers. The court
said:
"If the plaintiffs knew of the mistake, or if they had that notice of it
which consists in facts which, by the exercise of due care and diligence
will disclose it, they failed in their duty; and adoption of the check and
ratification of the payment will be implied. They cannot now require
the defendant to correct a mistake to its injury, from which it might
have protected itself but for the negligence of the plaintiff."11
In Hardy & Bros. v. Chesapeake Bank, 2 an action brought to recover
a balance alleged to be due, a clerk had forged fourteen checks before
his wrongdoing was discovered. The first five of these checks were
returned with the statement on July 13, 1873, and the others on October
sixth following. The forgeries were discovered October tenth. The
bank admitted its liability for the five checks first returned. The court
referring to these checks said:
"If the acts and knowledge of the agent in making the entries of those
checks in the bank book could be properly imputed to the appellants,
irrespective of knowledge in fact, those entries would amount to a rati-
fication and adoption of the acts of Holmes in drawing those checks, as
well as those dated subsequent to the 13th day of July, 1873.1' 1 3
The legal effect of the implied "adoption of the check," if it has any, seems
to be the same as if the depositor had himself authorized the signing of it to
begin with. If so, this is what is usually meant by ratifying the check and it is
unnecessary to infer any ratification of the payment. Indeed, it is difficult to
see how payment could be ratified for the bank is the debtor of the depositor.
It is not his agent in fact and does not profess to be such, but at least one writer
based a criticism of the doctrine of Critten v. Chemical National Bank, supra
note 2, in large part on the theory that the relation was one of agency. See
Chipman, op. cit. 534.
'2 (1879) 51 Md. 562, 569.
" Quite generally the courts, in this class of cases, use the terms "ratification"
and "adoption," as here, to mean the same thing. If the depositor can, when the
check has been forged and paid, by his own act cause a change of legal relation,
i. e., make the consequence the same as it would have been had the check paid
been genuine, his exercise of this power is what is usually called ratification. In
Hefner v. Vandolah (1872) 62 Ill. 483, 485, it was said that the court was justified
in finding that the defendant had understandingly "adopted and ratified the use
of his name and that there was no difference between an "adoption and ratifica-
tion" of this kind and the case where the person whose name had been forged
had, in the first instance, authorized the forger to sign it. The court's statement
that knowledge of the appellants, at a given time, that their names had been
forged would amount to a "ratification and adoption" of the subsequent drawing
of checks is a most unusual use of these terms.
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In Leather Manufacturer's Bank v. Morgan,4 a clerk had perpetrated
a series of forgeries extending from September ii, i88o, to February
14, 1881. Fourteen checks, drawn by the clerk and signed by the plain-
tiff, had been altered. The amount of each was raised and Where the
check was not, according to its original tenor, payable to bearer, it was
altered so that it became so payable. The plaintiff's pass-book was
written up and returned on October 7, i88o, with his cancelled checks,
among which were the first two checks raised by the clerk, these checks
being payable to "cash or bearer." The second time the pass-book was
balanced two other checks similarly altered were returned and also three
checks where the words, "or bearer," were written after the payee's
name. The clerk absconded, and the plaintiff, on March second, i8si,
had his pass-book balanced. Two checks were returned this time which
had been raised and made payable to bearer. The plaintiff immediately
discovered the forgeries and gave notice to the bank. In a suit to
recover his balance, which he alleged to include the amounts that had
been paid by the bank on the forged checks, the Supreme Court of the
United States, reversing the lower court, which had held that the
depositor was under no duty to examine his pass-book and vouchers,
said:
"If he had discovered that altered checks were embraced in the
account, and failed to give due notice thereof to the bank, it could not
be doubted that he would have been estopped to dispute the genuineness
of the checks in the form in which they were paid.... Still further, if
the depositor was guilty of negligence in not discovering and giving
notice of the fraud of his clerk, then the bank was thereby prejudiced,
because it was prevented from taking steps, by the arrest of the crim-
inal, or by an attachment of his property, or other form of proceeding,
to compel restitution. It is not necessary that it should be made to
appear, by evidence, that benefit would certainly have accrued to the
Bank from an attempt to secure payment from the criminal. Whether
the depositor is to be held as having ratified what his clerk did, or to
have adopted the checks paid by the bank'5 and charged to him, cannot
be made, in this action, to depend upon a calculation whether the crim-
inal had at the time the forgeries were committed, or subsequently;
property sufficient to meet the demands of the Bank. An inquiry as to
the damages in money actually sustained by the. Bank, by reason of the
neglect of the depositor to give notice of the forgeries, might be proper
if there were an action by it to recover damages for a violation of his
duty. But it is a suit by the depositor, in effect, to falsify a stated
account, to the injury of the bank, whose defense is that the depositor
has, by his conduct, ratified or adopted the payment of the altered
checks, and thereby induced it to forbear taking steps for its protection
against the person committing the forgeries.Y6 As the right to seek
14 (1885) H17 U. S. 96, 113, 6 Sup. Ct. 657, 663.
=' See supra note ii.
1, It is usually held that if one "ratifies" or "adopts" he is bound. Reliance by
the other party upon his acts is not necessary. If it was, the so-called ratifier
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and compel restoration and payment from the person committing the
forgeries was, in itself, a valuable one, it is sufficient if it appears that
the Bank, by reason of the negligence of the depositor, was prevented
17
from promptly and, it way be, effectively exercising it."",
In the case of Janin v. London & San Francisco Bank,
19 the plaintiff's
name was forged to a check for $16,7oo which was paid by the bank on
May twenty-ninth, 1878, and returned with a statement of account on
September fourth. Another statement was rendered December elev-
enth; and on the twenty-eighth the plaintiff intimated a doubt as to the
genuineness of the check, but made no claim that it was a forgery until
February first, 1879. In an action to recover his balance, including the
amount charged to him for the payment of this check, the bank set up
as a defence that the "plaintiff was estopped to deny the genuineness of
the check, because of his negligence in not examining his balanced pass-
book and returned vouchers, including the one in dispute, within a rea-
sonable time and giving notice that such check was forged, by reason of
which laches the defendant was prevented from tracing out the forger
of said check or said signature, if it was a forgery, and proceeding
against him for a period of nearly five months and until all trace of said
forger was lost." The Supreme Court of California, sustaining a
recovery by the plaintiff, said:
"The plaintiff was in no manner responsible for the action of the
defendant in paying the check. In making such payment it parted with
its own money, and not that of the plaintiff; and the loss consequent
thereon was its own, and should not be transferred to the plaintiff,
unless, from all the circumstances in the case, it appears reasonably
probable that, but for his alleged negligence, the defendant could have
protected itself. The defendant has not in fact discharged its indebted-
ness to plaintiff, and should not be permitted to debit him with any
amount as an offset thereto unless it appears that by reason of the negli-
gent conduct of the plaintiff it has omitted to take proceedings which
it otherwise would and could have taken to indemnify itself from loss.
This seems to us clear upon the plainest principles of justice. The
balancing of the pass-book in September, and charging the plaintiff
therein with the amount of the check, and its return to him at the same
time, constituted a statement of account between himself and the def end-
ant, and it thereupon became the duty of the plaintiff to examine the
same within a reasonable time, and give to defendant, without unreason-
able delay, notice of any objection which he had to it; and unless such
objection was made within a reasonable time it became an account
stated, and there was imposed upon the plaintiff the burden of showing
would have no power to make the bank's payment of the forged chedk tantamount
to payment of a genuine check.
' This does not mean that the depositor has in any way obstructed procedure
by the bank, but that he has simply failed to inform the bank that it had a cause
of action.
"Italics are the present writer's.
(1891) 92 Calif. 14, 23, 27 Pac. iioo, iioi.
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that the check with which he was debited was a forgery; and in addi-
tion to this, if the circumstances attending the entire transaction were
such as to make it reasonably probable that the bank had suffered
prejudice by plaintiff's unreasonable acquiescence in the account stated,
he would not be permitted to open the account by proof of. its incor-
rectness."
In similar vein, Professor Williston says :20
"Other circumstances besides the purchase of the forged instrument
on the faith of a representation may afford ground for an estoppel.
Thus, where a customer of a bank has negligently failed for a long
,period to examine cancelled checks and discover a forgery, as he would
have by such examination, he is estopped afterwards to assert his claim
against the bank which has been deprived of the means to protect itself
by recovery against another."
It is said by the Supreme Court of Michigan that the failure to object
to improper charges is to acquiesce in the amount as stated and places
on the depositor the burden of proving the incorrectness of the charge. 21
The foregoing quotations make it clear that the common statement
that a "bank pays at its peril" cannot safely be used as a basis to
prophesy courts' actions under all circumstances. By the majority
view, assuming that the depositor has been negligent in giving notice of
the forgery, the bank need not. pay him such amounts as were charged
to him on account of the forged checks paid; and most of the courts
which hold this view do not require that a causal relation be estallished
between the depositor's dereliction and a loss to the bank equal in
amount *to the forged checks paid. It suffices if the bank shows any
loss to have resulted.
The different theories by which this conclusion has been reached will
be separately considered.
RATIFICATION
Concerning the question whether one can ratify his forged signature,
Professor Williston says :22
"Whether a forgery can subsequently be ratified or adopted without
estoppel or new consideration is a question to which judicial answers are
hopelessly conflicting. It is pointed out that since the forgery did not
purport to b made on behalf of the person whose name was forged,
there can be no ratification. This criticism is sound. The person
whose signature it is may indeed adopt it, but adoption involves no
fictitious relation and to sustain a recovery after adoption either con-
sideration or estoppel should be requisite. Called by whatever name
the doctrine may be, the vital question is whether the enforcement of
the instrument without this basis should be permitted."
20 2 Contracts (1920) 2124.
"American Nationm2 Bak v. Bushey (1881) 45 Mich. 135, 7 N. W. 725.
Op. Cit. 2123.
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It seems to be entirely agreed that an unauthorized act in order to be
capable of ratification by oni must in fact be done by another as his
agent.23  There is disagreement, however, upon the question whether
there must also be a profession of agency. The more widely prevailing
view holds such profession to be indispensable.
4 But a few courts
have held that one who has full knowledge of the facts can ratify his
forged signature.2 5 Assuming such knowledge, one's sense of justice
receives no shock when the law makes the legal consequence of the rati-
fier's act exactly what he intended it to be, and, unless such consequence
operates substantially to the detriment of the social welfare, it seems
entirely unobjectionable.26  The reason generally given for the view
that a forgery cannot be ratified is that to permit such would encourage
the compromise of crime. The Supreme Court of Indiana, voicing the
more prevalent view, said that "it is impossible in such a: case to attrib-
ute any motive to the ratifying party but that of concealing the crime
and suppressing the prosecution.1 27  But in a case where a maker of a
2 i Mechem, Agency (0914) sec. 386 et seq.
241 Mechem, op. Cit. 28i-282. See 36 L. R. A. (N. s.) ioo6, note. But the
representation of authority may be implied from conduct alone. Scott v. Bank
of New Brunswick (894) 23 Can. Sup. Ct 277, 281.
'Greenfield Bank v. Crafts (1862, Mass.) 4 .Allen, 447; Cravens v. Gililan
(1876) 63 Mo. 28; Fay v. Slaughter (1902) 194 Ill. 157, 62 N. E. 592; Canpbell
v. Campbell (IgoI) 133 Calif. 33, 65 Pac. 134; Montgomery v. Crossthwait (I89O)
go Ala. 553, 8 So. 498. See M'Kenzie v. British Linen Co. (i88I, H. L.) L. R. 6
A. C. 82, 99; Scott v. Bank of New Brunswick, sttpra note 24. It seems to be
immaterial that the drawee bank had no knowledge of the forgery. De Feriet v.
Bank of America, supra note 9.
"Of course the forger may'be punished criminally notwithstanding the ratifi-
cation. Howell v. McCrie (887) 36 Kan. 636, i4 Pac. 257. In M'Kenzie v.
British Litnen Co., supra note 25, Lord Blackburn, at p. 99, said: "I wish to guard
against being supposed to say that if a document with an unauthorized signature
was uttered under such circumstances of intent to defraud that it amounted to
the crime of forgery, it is in the power of the person whose name was forged to
ratify it so as to make a defence for the forger against a criminal charge. I do
not-think he could. But if the person whose name was without authority used
chooses to ratify the act, even though known to be a crime, he makes himself
civilly responsible just as if he had originally authorized it. It is quite immaterial
whether this ratification was made to the person who seeks to avail himself of it
or to another."
"Henry v. Heeb (1887) 224 Ind. 275, 28o, 16 N. E. 6o6, 6o8. In an English
case, where there was an agreement not to prosecute, it was held that the forgery
could not be ratified for the additional reason that the forged signature was
illegal and void, Kelly, C. B., saying that "although a voidable act may be ratified
by matter subsequent, it is otherwise when an act is originally and in its inception
void." Brook v. Hook (i87I) L. R. 6 Exch. 89, 99. To say that the forger's act
was void does not aid in answering the question whether there is a power to
ratify, because it merely states as a reason for a conclusion the conclusion itself.
If the forger's act was void, it was without legal consequence. But certainly 
it
has made him criminally liable and civilly responsible to the person who advanced
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note, knowing his signature to be forged, promised to pay it, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that he must pay and said that
"this must stand on the general principles applicable to other contracts,
and is to be defeated only where the agreement was upon the under-
money and, though his act may have imposed no duty on the person whose name
was forged, it does not necessarily follow that such person does not acquire a
power to ratify. Society can and should make this a consequence if it is, on the
whole, socially desirable; if it does not see fit to make it a consequence, then
there is no power to ratify, but it does not aid to this conclusion to say that the
forger's act was "originally and in its inception void." See also i Mechem, op. cit.
265.
In Scott v. Bank of New Brunswick, supra note 24, where the plaintiff's
indorsement had been forged upon a non-negotiable certificate of deposit, which
had been surrendered for value to the defendant, referring to the above language
of Baron Kelly, it is said at p. 285:
"This last ratio decidendi is clearly inconsistent with Lord Blackburn's enunci-
ation of the law in McKenzie v. The British Linen Co., 6 App. Cas. 99, and can
no longer be regarded as authority. Moreover the reasoning on which it proceeds
would be inapplicable here, for granting that the payment of the money for
which the receipt in the present case was given was obtained by Robinson by
false and fraudulent pretenses, and that any agreement so brought about would
be illegal and void, there would still remain the fact that the money was actually
paid over to him by the bank, and it is to this payment that the respondents seek
to have the ratification' applied. A contract, or a pretended contract, like a
forged note, may be void in law ab initio or nonexistent so that there is nothing
to ratify, but a fact like a payment cannot be got rid of in that way. The
payment was therefore clearly a substantial act susceptible of ratification .......
It is respectfully submitted that the distinction here suggested is unfounded.
If "a contract or pretended contract, like a forged note," is supported by such
consideration as would make it enforceable by the promisee or holder, under
ordinary circumstances, there is always the very real act of the forger as well as
the fact of payment or parting with value; and only the former can be ratified,
because the payment by the bank in the check cases is made as debtor and in no
case is it made as agent. Fundamentally it makes no difference whether the
crook induces the bank to part with value by forging an indorsement on a certi-
ficate of deposit, a depositor's signature to a check, or a maker's name to a
promissory note. In each case, the ratifier's act is simply added to an already
existing aggregate of facts and, when added, is said to have the same legal effect
as would have been caused by that aggregate had it included authorization. In
each case the question is whether it is socially desirable to make such the conse-
quence of the ratification. It would never be so unless in the preceding aggregate
there was a payment or giving of consideration.
.In another case where it was claimed that the defendant had ratified his forged
signature as maker of a promissory note by promising to pay it, it was said that
the plaintiff could not recover because the defendant's promise was without con-
sideration. Workman v. Wright (1878) 33 Ohio St. 305. No other case has been
found which holds consideration necessary to a binding ratification. But if the
promisee gave value when such a note was delivered, he at once acquired a quasi-
contractual cause of action against the forger and, if it was expressed or rea-
sonably to be implied that the promisee relinquished this cause of action or even
agreed to forbear to sue upon it in return for the ratifier's promise to pay, there
would be ample consideration. The same court in another similar case said:
"Forgery being a crime, there could be no ratification of that crime that could
operate to change its character. The crime being completed, it would forever
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standing that, if the signature was adopted, the guilty party was not to
be prosecuted for the criminal offense."28  Should the mere absence of
an agreement not to prosecute the forger make this difference, if the
probability that there will be no prosecution is substantially as great?
One may well doubt with the Indiana court whether the principal desire
or expectation of a ratifier is ever any other result. The normal
aversion to initiating and sponsoring such prosecutions would generally
make the forger safe if the person upon whom he imposed has been
satisfied and the failure of such person to initiate criminal proceedings
subjects him to no punishment. But the argument of the Indiana
court proves too much. If the voluntary promise to pay of the
person whose name has been forged is held to be unenforceable
because to hold it otherwise would remove the incentive to prosecute,
why will the forger himself be required to pay the promissory note
which he has given for the money obtained by the forgery?
29 If the
third person, instead of ratifying by promising to pay the forged note,
remain a criminal act, and George M. Shinew could not by any subsequent conduct
or omission on his part ratify a crime that would give validity to an instrument
that was absolutely void at the time of its execution. It is true, however, that,
while he might not by any act or conduct on his part ratify a forgery of his
name, so as to make the instrument a valid instrument, yet he might by his con-
duct, or even by mere silence, estop himself from defending against the payment
of the same, on the ground that his signature was a forgery; but before he can
be estopped by mere silence facts must be alleged and proven showing a duty and
opportunity to speak, that the party to be estopped knew, or had reason to believe,
that the holder of the note would rely on his silence, and that he did rely on his
silence and was injured thereby." Shinew v. First National Bank (i91I) 84 Ohio
St. 297, 3o6, 95 N. E. 881, 882. (Italics are the present writer's.)
The difference between denying Shinew the power by ratification to "make the
instrument a valid instrument," i. e., to impose upon himself a duty to pay it, and
allowing him to "estop himself from defending against the payment of the same"
seems most unsubstantial. In each case his conduct is simply added to the facts
which have already happened. How his having to pay under the latter rather
than the former theory militates any differently against the public interest is not
apparent. He exercises a power in each case, as a practical matter, because the
person on whom the forger has imposed will almost necessarily rely upon the
defendant's silence and sustain injury as a result of his necessary delay in the
prosecution of his remedy against the forger, and this, according to many cases,
is sufficient injury. See Leather Manufacturer's Bank v. Morgan, supra note x4.
It is well settled that a tort may be ratified. i Mechem, op. cit. secs. 357, 5o6.
And if one should commit a tort, while acting for another but without the scope
of his employment, the mere fact that the act done is a crime is not necessarily
a reason for denying the power to ratify the tort which usually exists.
" Greenfield Bank v. Crafts (1862, Mass.) 4 Allen, 447, 455. And where one
acknowledged to, a holder of a promissory note that his forged signature as maker
was genuine, such acknowledgment was held to be a ratification notwithstanding
the fact that the plaintiff was negligent in taking the note. Central National Bank
v. CopP (1903) 184 Mass. 328, 68 N. E. 334.
See Chandler v. Johnson (1869) 39 Ga. 85. Cf. Fountain v. Bigham (1912)
235 Pa. 35, 85 Atl. 131. Where a postmaster had misappropriated funds and 
the
sureties on his bond demanded a promissory note signed by himself and satis-
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has actually paid it, or if the forger has returned the money received,
it can hardly be doubted that it would be held, even if there was a
promise not to prosecute, that the cause of action against the forger of
the person originally defrauded would be extinguished,30 and yet there
results .the same discouragement to prosecution which follows where
there is simply a promise to pay. So long as the prosecution of the
forger is not considered vital enough to society's welfare to require,
under pain of punishment, that the defrauded person, or any one who
knows of the forgery,31 take steps looking to the punishment of the
criminal it seems reasonable to allow the defrauded person to take steps
to make himself whole, by getting either payment or a promise of pay-
ment from the payee or from the person whose name was forged, pro-
vided he makes no promise not to prosecute. In attempting thus to
save himself from loss by another's wrongful act he but follows his
human instinct to preserve his own property and he thus keeps within
reasonable bounds. In such a situation, there is no substantial public
interest that can effectively and consistently be protected or that ought
to be protected at what will often prove to be such great cost to the
defrauded person. The forger or his friends, among whom will often
be the person whose name has been forged, will usually be ready to pay
or promise to pay; and, if the defrauded person is unwilling to accept
or unsafe in accepting the promise to pay, the money itself will usually
be found and there will inevitably be the resulting inclination not to
prosecute, simply because human nature is as it is. If the payment
extinguishes the forger's debt but the promise creates no duty, the
practical result is that a forger can be reasonably certain of not being
prosecuted if he is able to get the money with which to pay. If he is
not so fortunate, simply because a promise to pay is ineffective, he is
at a very practical disadvantage. This would certainly cause no con-
cern if all forgers were in the same predicament. But the case of the
factory sureties to secure them from loss, there being no express agreement by
the sureties not to prosecute, it was said that the note and a trust deed to secure
it were valid and it was held that equity would not decree the cancellation of the
note and deed. Rock v. Mathews (89) 35 W. Va. 537, '4 S. E. 137.
' It is not surprising that no case has been found where it is sought to compel
a second payment on the ground that the voluntary receipt of the first was under
such circumstances that public policy requires that it be of no effect.
' No reason is apparent for holding the defrauded person to a greater duty to
see criminal proceedings begun than any other person who has the same informa-
tion. Neither is penalized if he merely fails to act; and no promise to either,
made in consideration of his forbearing or promising to forbear to act, is enforce-
able. Either is liable criminally at common law if, for a consideration, he desists
from, or promises to desist from, prosecuting. Regina v. Burgess (1885) L. IL
16 Q. B. Div. I41. See contra State v. Jefferson (1916) 88 N. J. L. 447, 97 Atl.
162. This is the almost universal view under modern statutes. Watt v. State
(1892) 97 Ala. 72, II So. goi; People v. Bryon (1894) 3O3 Calif. 675, 37 Pac. 754;
Frilby v. State (884) 42 Ohio St. 205; State v. Ash (1898) 33 Or. 86, 54 Pac. 184.
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innocent person defrauded, to whom an enforceable promise to pay the
debt due him cannot be made and who on this account will very proba-
bly lose his money, has both his innocence and his having given value
to distinguish it. It seems extremely questionable whether the incon-
siderable promotion of society's welfare to be found in the slight
increase in probability that the forger will be prosecuted justifies the
retention, at such comparably great expense to the defrauded person,
of a rule that operates thus inconsistently. On the whole, it seems
socially desirable that there should be a power to ratify a forgery of
one's signature within the limits named by the Massachusetts court.
But whether one can ratify a forgery of his signature when he has
full knowledge of the facts and desires to do so is very different from
the instant problem in which there is no intent or desire to ratify and
generally nothing more than a constructive knowledge of the acts that
are said to be ratified. It is to be noted that there is not here the basis
for implying a ratification that exists where one knowingly retains
benefits resulting fr6m acts done by another on his behalf. If ratifica-
tion is to be implied, it is not because of the receipt of benefits but
because of the depositor's failure to act for the purpose of preventing
loss to the bank.32 That this is an anomalous basis for the implication
of a ratification cannot be denied; but the application of the doctrine
is not to be condemned solely on this accbunt if it works out a result
that commends itself as just. It certainly has not the tendency referred
to by the Indiana court to discourage prosecution of the forger. The
incentive to bring about his punishment is still present; it is merely
shifted from the bank to the depositor. But, if the forger has
not succeeded in making his escape-the contrary is perhaps more
often the case-and is prosecuted and punished, the depositor receives
no financial benefit. Can he sue the forger in a civil action? It is well
settled that the bank can sue the forger as soon as it has paid money to
him.3 3 If the failure of the depositor to give notice is a ratification,
the result is a novation3 4 The depositor is now the creditor of the
If the bank is negligent in paying the check, it seems that the depositor's
silence is not a ratification. Dana v. National Bank of the Republic (1882) 132
Mass. 156, i58. This exception has been said to be "somewhat inconsistent with
the principle on which the doctrine rests." Critten v. Chemical National Bank
(1902) 171 N. Y. 219, 229, 63 N. E. 969, 972. It shows, however, the unwilling-
ness of the court to allow conventionality of application to force it to do an
obvious injustice. One wonders if discovery of the forgery by the bank after a
payment without negligence would prevent the depositor's silence from being a
ratification.
'Dudley & West Bromwich Banking Co. v. Spittle (i86o, Ch.) I John. & Hem.
14. See Leather Manufacturer's Bank v. Morgan, supra note 14.
"Professor Williston, with reference to contracts made by promoters on
behalf of corporations not yet organized, says: "The cases generally speak of
the obligation of the corporation as created by adoption, but novation seems the
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forger, the bank's cause of action against the forger is extinguished,
and its indebtedness to the depositor pro tanto reduced, and this is the
consequence notwithstanding the fact that neither the depositor, the
bank, nor the forger has assented to such a change in their relations and
such consequence might be contrary to the desire of every person con-
cerned if he knew the facts. Justice between the bank and its depositor
is thought to require this unusual result, and it is made to follow without
any inquiry as to whether the bank would have been in any better posi-
tion if the depositor had given prompt notice of the forgery as soon as
he knew or should have known of it. Since the depositor does not
intend or desire to ratify and has received no benefit, justice requires
that he be not held to have ratified by failing to give notice of the for-
gery unless there is a resulting injury to the bank and, even then, only
to the extent to which the bank has been injured. The doctrine of
ratification, however, has never been applied with such limitations and
to so limit it, it is admitted, would be to apply it in a most unusual fash-
ion. Even the unconventional application of the doctrine now made by
the courts is but a clumsy and unreliable device for reaching justice and
it seems better not to depart from the orthodox basis for its applica-
tion, in order to improve it, unless the application of no other principle
produces a more just result.
ESTOPPEL
It may be observed to begin with that the courts have never held, as
suggested by Professor Williston,5 that an estoppel is requisite, after
adoption, in order to bind the depositor. Whenever the basis for an
estoppel was thought to exist, it, without more, was regarded as amply
sufficient ground upon which to deny the depositor any recovery. And
more accurate term. If the assent of the corporation to the bargain is merely
an adoption of it, the promoter apparently must still remain liable. But it seems
more nearly to correspond with the intention of the parties to suppose that when
the corporation assents to the contract, it assents to take the place of the
promoter-a change of parties to which the other side of the contract assented
in advance. There would then be a novation which would discharge the pro-
moter at the time the corporation assumed the obligation." i Contracts, 582.
So where a forged check is paid and the depositor, with knowledge of all the
facts, assents that the legal consequence shall be the same as if the check had
been genuine, there is no objection in legal theory to the novation consequence,
if it is justifiable to imply a consent in advance by the bank that its claim against
the forger be transferred to the depositor in return for a pro tanto decrease of
its indebtedness to him. But it must be noted that this assumes an intent by the
bank with reference to a cause of action when it is ignorant of its existence and
must of course be a pure fiction. The result, however, may not be seriously
objectionable, since it includes that which was expected by the bank at the time
it made payment, as well as that desired by the depositor. The same cannot be
said where the depositor simply has constructive knowledge because of his
negligence.
"' See srupra note 22.
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it seems entirely pertinent to inquire in the beginning why it is neces-
sary to invoke the doctrine of estoppel, a far greater favorite among
the courts than either ratification or adoption. Every court which
applies it takes as its starting point the so-called duty of the depositor
to speak or, otherwise stated, the duty to prevent such loss to the bank
as can be prevented only by a prompt disclosure"8 of such material facts
as are known or would be known if a reasonable examination" were
" In the following cases the depositor was held not to have acted sufficiently
promptly. Knights of Joseph Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Guarantee Trust & Safe
Deposit Co. (I918) 69 Pa. Super. Ct. 8g (.five weeks); Haminerschlag Mfg. Co.
v. Importers' & Traders' Nat. Bank (1919, C. C. A. 2d) 262 Fed. 266 (nine
months); Connors v. Old Forge Discount & Deposit Bank (1914) 245 Pa. 97,
91 AtI. 210 (43 days); McNeeley v. Bank of North, America (i9o8) 221 Pa. 588,
7o At. 891 (three and one-half months); Isreal v. State Bank of New Orleans
(i9o9) 124 La. 885, 5o So. 783 (two months). In De Feriet v. Bank of America
(1871) 23 La. Ann. 310, failure to object for seven days after knowledge of a
forgery was held to be a ratification. But notice was held to have been given
within a reasonable time where the statement was rendered February 2d, 1917,
and the forgery discovered by a new clerk on February 2oth, the plaintiff being
absent from his home at the time the account was rendered and until the thir-
teenth, when the forging clerk absconded. Denbigh v. First National Bank
(1918) 1O2 Wash. 546, 174 Pac. 475. Where notice is given on the day the
forgery is discovered, the bank has no claim though the forged check is not
tendered until twenty-four days thereafter. Brixen v. Deseret National Bank
(1888) 5 Utah, 504, 18 Pac. 43. But if the depositor fails to give notice of
forgeries on the day he receives his statement, he is not estopped to deny the
genuineness of checks paid on that day. Isreal v. State Bank of New Orleans,
supra.
Where there is no dispute as to the time of the rendition of the account, and
the time of making the objection, the reasonableness of the time in which the
depositor should nake his objection is a question of law. McKeen v. The
Boatmen's Bank (I898) 74 Mo. App. 281, 289.
"The depositor is under no duty so to conduct the examination that it will
necessarily lead to the discovery of 'the fraud. If he examines the voucher
personally and is himself deceived by the skilful character of the forgery, his
omission to discover it will not shift to him the loss which, in the first instance,
is the loss of the bank. National Dredging Co. v. Farmers" Bank (19o8, Del.) 6
Pen. 58o, 69 Atl. 6o7. See also Leather Manufacturer's Bank v. Morgan (1885)
117 U. S. 96, 6 Sup. Ct. 657; Hardy v. Chesapeake Bank (1879) 51 Md. 562.
But where the forging clerk had allowed only genuine checks to reach the
depositor's hands, a mere comparison of these with the stubs in the check book
was not a reasonable examination. The comparison should have included the
check list. Morgan v. United States Mortgage & Trust Co. (1913) 208 N. Y.
218, I0I N. E. 871. See also First National Bank v. Richmond Electric Co.
(19o7) io6 Va. 347, 56 S. E. 152. The depositor was also charged with notice of
a forgery where he saw a check filled out in a strange handwriting for which
there was no corresponding stub, though his signature thereon was so skilfully
forged as to defy detection. Isreal v. State Bank of New Orleans (19o9) 124
La. 885, 50 So. 783. The depositor is always charged with knowledge of such
facts as would be disclosed by a comparison of the checks returned with the
stubs in his check book. Critten v. Chemical National Bank (1902) 171 N. Y.
219, 63 N. E. 969. An examination was held to be sufficient where the depositor
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made of the materials placed in his hands by the bank."' If, as the
courts say, the depositor is under a duty to the bank, it would seem that
ascertained that the vouchers corresponded with his check stubs, that the balance
showni by his check book corresponded with that shown by his pass-book, and then
compared the checks returned with the entries in the pass-book, by himself
watching the checks while the dishonest clerk read the entries from the pass-book
and concealed discrepancies by omitting to call out the entries of payments of
forged checks which he had surreptitiously abstracted. Frank v. Chemical
National Bank (1881) 84 N. Y. 2og. A depositor is never required to examine
records which are not directly connected with his bank account. National Bank
of Commerce v. Tacoma Mill Co. (191o, C. C. A. 9th) 182 Fed. I. Whether a
reasonable examination has been made is a question of fact. First National
Bank of Richmond v. Richmond Electric Co., supra.
It is generally said that the depositor is not required to look for forged indorse-
ments because he is not supposed to know the payee's signature. National Bank
of Commerce v. Fish (1916, Okla.) 169 Pac. 11o5; Pratt v. Union National Bank
(1909) 79 N. J. L. 117, 75 AtI. 313; Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Hmne Savings
Bank of Los Angeles (igi) i8o Calif. 6oi, 182 Pac. 293. But where there are
circumstances sufficient to excite the suspicions of a reasonably prudent man as
to the genuineness of indorsements, the depositor must make inquiry. Wind v.
Fifth National Bank (1889) 39 Mo. App. 72; Atlanta National Bank v. Burke
(1888) 81 Ga. 597, 7 S. E. 738; Osborn v. Corn. Exchange National Bank (1920)
218 Ill. App. 28. Where a corporation issued its checks for the purpose of
making loans, it had notice that the payee's indorsements were forged where the
blank indorsement of its treasurer appeared immediately underneath that of the
payee. Pannonia Building & Loan Association v. West Side Trust Co. (1919)
93 N. J. L. 377, io8 Atl. 240. See NoTEs (1920) 5 CoRN. L. QUART. i6o. But the
drawer must tender such a check to the drawee bank before he can recover the
amount paid on it. See Kearney v. Metropolitan Trust Co. (I9o5) iio App. Div.
236, 97 N. Y. Supp. 274, aff'd 186 N. Y. 61l, 79 N. E. iio8.
A great diversity of view exists as to what constitutes a performance of the
depositor's duty in the examination of his statement and vouchers when he does
not make the examination personally. It seems sufficient if made by a faithful
and competent employee. Shipman v. Bank of the State (1891) 126 N. Y. 318,
27 N. E. 371. And all the authorities agree that the depositor is not charged with
knowledge of the forgery because of the fact that his clerk, who committed it,
had knowledge of it. First National Bank v. Richmond Electric Co. (1907) io6
Va. 347, 56 S. E. 152; Shipman v. Bank of State, supra. But if the examination
is entrusted to the dishonest employee, who forged the checks, as is very often
the case, the following rules as to its sufficiency have been applied: (i) By
entrusting the examination to the dishonest employee, the depositor is charged
with the employee's antecedent knowledge. First National Bank v. Richmond
Electric Co., supra. (2) Such art examination is in legal effect no examination at
all. August v. Fourth National Bank (1888, Sup. Ct.) 48 Hun, 620, I N. Y. Supp.
139. (3) The depositor fulfills his duty by entrusting the examination to an
employee reasonably believed to be honest and competent. Kenneth Investment
Co. v. National Bank of the Rep;tblic (19o3) 103 Mo. App. 613, 77 S. W. J002.
(4) The depositor is charged with such knowledge as a reasonable examination
would have disclosed to a competent and honest employee. Dana v. National
Bank of the Republic, supra note 32. (5) If a reasonable supervision, by the
depositor, of the dishonest employee's examination would have disclosed the
forgeries, the depositor is charged with knowledge. Leather Manufacturers'
Bank v. Morgan, supra. The fourth test seems to be most generally used.
"A depositor who left his pass-book to be balanced and neglected for two
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the ordinary rule that one must compensate another for such injury as
proximately results from a failure to perform his duty would be entirely
adequate. But, say the courts, the depositor, by failing to object when
he knows or ought to know of the forgery, thereby represents that such
checks are genuine, and when the bank relies upon such representation,
the depositor's mouth is closed to deny that they are genuine. They
make the consequence the same as if the depositor had in some way
represented that the check was genuine, thereby causing the bank to pay.
It must, however, be borne in mind that it was no act or representation
of the depositor that caused the bank to pay the check. In an English
case, so great was th importance attached to this fact that the deposi-
tor's neglect was said not to be tfie "effective cause" of the bank's loss.
Mr. Justice Channell said :9
"The authorities are rather against the contention that there is a duty
on the part of the depositor to examine his pass-book, but the point is
not very important because even if there was a duty the particular loss
by honoring the first check was not caused by the nonperformance of
that duty."
This reasoning, however, is not convincing because it proceeds from
an erroneous conception of the depositor's duty. That duty has never
been held to come into existence until the depositor is charged with
knowledge that his name has been forged, and this must necessarily be
subsequent to payment. Moreover, when it exists, it is not simply to
examine the pass-book and cancelled checks. It includes also the
giving of notice. If it did not include this, it would be worthless to the
bank for whose benefit alone it is imposed, and the bank could never
recover more than nominal damages, because a breach could never in
fact cause injury. Furthermore, the question whether the depositor's
neglect of duty has caused injury to the bank is not referred and lim-
ited to the moment at which the check was paid. Inqtiiry must be
made as to whether the bank would have been benefited by prompt
notice. To the extent to which it is made less able by the delay or
inaction to get other dollars to replace those paid to the forger there
is injury and it is "effectively caused" by the depositor's failure to
perform his duty.
Those courts in this country which apply the doctrine of estoppel
reach the other extreme. Assuming the depositor not to have given
prompt notice, when he has actual or constructive knowledge of for-
months to call for it was held not charged with notice that forged checks had been
debited to his account. It is necessary that the pass-book and vouchers be
actually placed in his hands. McCarty v. First National Bank of Birmingham
(1920) 2o4 Ala. 424, 85 So. 754.
Walker v. Manchester & Liverpool District Banking Co. (1913, K. B.) 29
T. L. R. 492, 493.
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geries, the bank has a complete defence against his claim to the extent
to which it has paid such checks, provided that the bank sustains any
injury as a result. A few of such courts have held that mere delay in
proceeding against the forger is sufficient injury,40 but according to the
view of the great majority, it must appear that some advantage would
have resulted from such a proceeding.41  They all agree that it is not
necessary that the bank show a loss resulting from the depositor's
neglect equal in amount to the forged checks paid.
This view, unless either the depositor has actual knowledge or the
loss to the bank is the amount of the forged checks, satisfies the require-
ments of justice no more than does that of implied ratification. The
depositor made no representation as to the validity of the checks; and
when the bank paid them, intending thereby to decrease its indebted-
ness, it knew that this result could be accomplished only by the exercise
of its power and that it must decide for itself whether such a power
existed. But the bank is under a duty to pay if the check is valid and
its refusal to do so may make it liable to an action for damages. The
bank's position is therefore a difficult one and its honest attempt to per-
form its duty often exposes it to considerable risk of loss. But for this
the bank is compensated, because it becomes the owner of the money
deposited and, as such, enjoys its use. If, therefore, the depositor does
nothing to mislead it when it pays a forged check, it seems but fair that
the -bank and not the depositor should have to get its money from the
forger or lose it. But the depositor is generally the only one who can
know positively whether his signature has been forged and when the
bank sends to him his statement and cancelled checks, requesting to be
informed ff forged cherks are charged to him, it is entirely reasonable to
require the depositor to act in order that the bank may thereby be
enabled to retrieve the loss incident to innocent error.4 2 If prompt
'Leather Manufacturers' Bank v. Morgan (1885) 117 U. S. 96, 6 Sup. Ct 657;
Myers v. Southwestern National Bank (1899) 193 Pa. I, 44 Atl. 280; McNeeley
Co. v. Bank of North America (i9o8) 221 Pa. 588, 70 AtI. 891. In Connors v.
Old Forge Discount & Deposit Bank (1914) 245 Pa. 97, 91 Atl. 21o, the depositor
could not recover the amount of a check when he delayed for forty-three days to
give notice of a forged indorsement though it appeared that the forger had
already absconded when the plaintiff learned of the forgery.
' Any advantage is enough. National Bank of Commerce v. Fish (1916, Okla.)
169 Pac. iio5; Pratt v. Union National Bank (1909) 79 N. J. L. 117, 75 Atl. 313;
Janin v. London & San Francisco Bank (i8gi) 92 Calif. 14, 27 Pac. ILOO;
Weinstein v. National Bank of Jefferson (1887) 69 Tex. 38, 6 S. W. 171; Wind
v. Fifth National Bank (1889) 39 Mo. App. 72; Murphy v. Metropolitan National
Bank (19o6) 191 Mass. 159, 77 N. E. 693; Houseman-Spitaley Corporation v.
American State Bank (1919) 2o5,Mich. 268, 171 N. W. 543; Harlem Co-operative
Building & Loan Association v. Mercantile Trust Co. (1895, C. P.) io Misc. 68o,
31 N. Y. Supp. 790.
' In some states statutes'have been passed providing that "no bank shall be
liable to a depositor for the payment by it of a forged or raised check, unless
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notice is given and yet the bank is unable to retrieve its loss, no court
holds that the bank has a defence to any extent, because the depositor
has been diligent and it was not his duty to prevent loss at all events.
If prompt notice would have been of no avail to the bank, most of
these courts hold that the depositor's failure to give notice may not be
used as a defence against his claim. 43 To allow the bank to shift its
loss to the depositor under such circumstances would be to penalize
inaction when action would have been wholly futile. If, however, the
bank could have retrieved a part of its loss at the time when notice
should have been given, but is unable to collect anything when the f or-
gery is finally discovered, or, if the bank could have recovered com-
pletely at the time when notice-should have been given, but is able to
collect only a part when it is finally informed of the forgery, these
courts hold that the bank has a defence against the depositbr's entire
claim notwithstanding the fact that prompt action by the depositor could
not possibly have resulted in more than a partial replacement of the
money paid to the forger by the bank. A duty to prevent such loss as
can be prevented only by prompt notice seems to be the utmost that
should be required of the depositor, and he should have to pay, or the
bank should be allowed an offset against his claim in only such an
amount as will compensate the bank for the damage which it would
ultimately sustain because of his neglect. But if the orthodox applica2
tion of the doctrine of estoppel is made, such a result cannot possibly
be reached where the injury to the bank is not the exact amount of the
forged checks paid. The depositor is entirely estopped or not at all;
the bank has a complete defence or none at all. It cannot be denied that
the existence of a duty is not vital to an estoppel and that the courts
generally find it unnecessary to apply that doctrine where there is a
duty. If we say in defence of the courts that apply this principle that
they do not mean "duty" when they say it, we have the rather strange
result that, where one has no duty to act, his inaction may subject him
to greater financial loss than it would if he were under a duty to act.
within one year after the return to the depositor of the voucher of such payment
such depositor shall notify such bank that the check so paid was forged or raised.
See Pratt v. Union National Bank (1909) 79 N. J. L. 117, 75 Atl. 313; Shattuck
v. Guardian Trust Co. (1912) 208 N. Y. 200, 97 N. E. 517. In one state the
notice must be given within sixty days. See Denbigh v. First National Bank
(1918) lO2 Wash. 546, 174 Pac. 475. Similar statutes have been enacted in
California, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. Sound commercial
policy may require that the depositor give notice at all events when his signature
is forged or when the alteration is upon the face of the instrument, but it is
questionable whether such a statute should be construed to require notice, linder
all circumstances, of forged indorsements. See Noms (1920) 5 CORN. L. QuART.
i6o, 164.
4' See supra note 41.' Contra, authorities cited sapra note 40.
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But those same courts that appear to be most confident that the
application of the doctrine of estoppel conducts them to a just result
have found it necessary rather arbitrarily to limit it. In Leather Man-
ufacturer's -Bank v. Morgan,4" Mr. Justice Harlan said:
"Of course, if the defendant's officers, before paying the altered
checks, could by proper care and skill have detected -the forgeries, then
it could not receive a credit for the amount of those checks, even if the
depositor omitted all examination of his account."4
If there is any reason for this limitation, it must be that the deposi-
tor's silence is no representation that the checks paid were genuine;
for, if it is, the bank may rely upon it., The only apparent reason for
saying that silence is no representation is that, under such circum-
stances, the bank cannot expect the depositor to object when he discov-
ers the forgery.46 If such repudiation could reasonably be expected,
silence would furnish every reason given by these courts for applying
the doctrine if the bank is thereby misled.
In the inquiry as to whether there may be such reasonable expecta-
tion, it must be borne in mind that only the depositor can positively
know that a check is forged and also that payment, even negligently, of
a genuine check decreases the bank's indebtedness. Nor must it be
forgotten that silence is a tacit representation, because, under the cir-
cumstances, the ordinary person would speak. Furthermore, banks
" (1885) II7 U. S. 96, 112, 6 Sup. Ct. 657, 663.
"If the doctrine of estoppel must be applied to a situation to which it is
inapplicable, the limitation here suggested, though from a practical viewpoint it
cannot be justified, will serve to decrease injustice to the extent to which it with-
draws from the operation of the doctrine cases in which the loss caused by the
depositor's neglect is not the amount of the forged checks paid. The limitation
suggested is noticed here because it will be relevant later in determining whether
the depositor's silence is a representation that checks paid were genuine upon
which the bank can rely in the payment of subsequent checks similarly forged.
For this purpose the writer believes that good faith in paying the check is the
correct test.
"Where the plaintiffs delivered to the defendant a power of attorney, authoriz-
ing their clerk to settle their account and draw on it within certain limits, and the
defendant paid a number of checks drawn by the clerk in excess of his authority
all of which were regularly returned with the monthly statement, it was held
that the charges of such checks to plaintiff's account were invalid and that the
plaintiff's failure to object to such charges did not estop them, since the power
of attorney informed the bank that the clerk would settle the account and it had
no reason to believe that the plaintiffs had any knowledge that such checks had
been paid. Farrell v. First National Bank (192o, E. D. Pa.) 263 Fed. 778. See
Manufacturers' National Bank v. Barnes (1872) 65 Ill. 69. The plaintiff was also
allowed to recover where the defendant bank paid a number of checks payable
to the order of the plaintiff to the plaintiff's clerk, who had authority to indorse
for deposit. National Bank of Commerce v. Tacoma Mill Co. (1910, C. C. A.
9th) 182 Fed. i.
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have everything to lose and nothing to gain by paying forged checks
and never make payment even where there is only a suspicion as to a
check presented for payment. Moreover, the bank must form its
opinion as to whether the check is genuine in the hurry of business.
The depositor cannot know all the circumstances under which the bank
paid and he may not conclude that, because it seems obvious to him
that the check was forged, it was obvious also to the bank, that it there-
fore knowingly paid a forged check, and does not need to be notified.
If the depositor is ever to be excused from giving notice, it should be
only when it is clear that the bank did not pay in good faith; for it is
only in such cases that the bank does not need and ought not to expect
notice. So limited, occasion for applying the rule would rarely exist.
If it is argued that this rule places on the depositor the duty 6f pro-
tecting the bank from loss in cases where, though it has acted in good
faith, it would have been possible for it to discover facts which would
have caused it not to part with its money, it may reasonably be replied
that because it is undesirable socially that forgers should ultimately
succeed in gathering where they have not sown, in view of his relation
to the bank, the depositor must act to prevent it to the extent to which
his last clear chance is indispensable.
But unless it can be established that, where damage is suffered, it is
not necessarily the amount of the forged checks paid, it is clear that the
depositor should be denied any recovery and the question as to whether
it should be denied on the ground of ratification, adoption, estoppel, or
neglect of duty is, at most, of mere academic interest.
Any one of the following situations may well exist where forged
checks have been paid: (i) at the time when notice should have been
given, no part of the bank's claim against the forger was collectible and
the same is true when the bank receives notice ;47 (2) the entire claim is
collectible when notice should have been given, and it is still collectible
a.Of course, if the payment is to a holder in due course, the doctrine of
Price v. Neal (1762, K. B.) 3 Burr. 1354, enacted in section 62 of the Negotiable
Instruments Laws, prevents 'recovery by the bank. Brannon, The Negotiable
Instruments Law (1919, 3d ed.) 225. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
recently refused a recovery to a drawee bank where it had paid a series of twelve
forged checks. According to the view of most courts, it was a plain case for the
application of Section 62 of the N. I. L. The recovery was denied, however, as
to the first ten of the checks, on the ground that the plaintiff's notice, though it
was given immediately after the depositor's repudiation of the checks, was too
late, and, as to the last two, on the ground that, though notice was prompt enough,
payment of the other checks estopped the plaintiff to deny that they were genuine.
Union National Bank v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank (1921) 271 Pa. 107, 114
Atl. 5o6. Payment of a check is not an acceptance within the meaning of sec-
tion 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, as interpreted by the Pennsylvania
courts, and the statute of 1849 (Pub. Laws, 26; Pa. Sts. 1920, sec. 16o11),
evidently passed for the purpose of repudiating the doctrine of Price v. Neal, is
still operative. See (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 296.
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when notice is received; (3) it was all collectible when notice should
have been given and no part is collectible when notice is received;
(4) the entire claim was collectible when notice should have been given
and a part is still collectible when the bank receives notice; (5) only a
part of the claim was collectible when notice should have been given and
no part is collectible when notice is received. Those courts that apply
the doctrine of estoppel recognize the injustice of denying the depositor
a recovery in the first situation because no causal connection exists
between the depositor's inaction and the inescapable loss.48 In class
two the bank has not sustained any loss and those same courts have not
thought the depositor's inaction a reason for shifting to him the burden
of collecting from the forger.49 In the third class every American
court, irrespective of the principle that it applies, is conducted to
the conclusion that the depositor cannot recover any part of his claim
because his inaction has caused loss to that extent. If every case not
falling within the first and second classes fell within the third, the
result reached by the application of the doctrine of estoppel would be
unobjectionable; but those courts that apply it are forced to the same
conclusion in classes four and five as in class three. This may be
because they believe that such cases as are illustrated by the last two
classes do not arise or, if they do arise, that justice requires the same
result as is required in class three. The view has already been sug-
gested that the latter conclusion is wrong, but it is well to notice that in
class four the bank can still collect a part of its claim. The depositor
should lose to the extent to which the bank is unable to collect when it
receives notice of the forgery, because to that extent hih neglect has
caused the loss, as in class three; but there is no more reason for placing
upon the depositor the burden of collecting the remainder of the claim
than in class two. In the fifth case the depositor should lose only that
part of the claim that was collectible when he should have given notice.
This much of the loss has resulted from his neglect and to this extent
he should have to pay or, what is the same thing, the bank should have
a defence. But the remainder of the loss could never have been pre-
vented by the depositor and the reasons of class one apply. That injury
is not necessarily caused by the depositor's inaction is recognized by
these courts in deciding cases falling within classes one and two.50
"National Bank of Commerce v. Fish (1916, Okla.) 169 Pac. 11o5.
"See cases cited in supra note 41.
'This was expressly recognized in the following cases where the signature of
the drawer was forged or the check altered. Weinstein v. National Bank of
Jefferson (1887) 69 Tex. 38, 6 S. W. 171; Wind v. Fifth National Bank (1889)
39 Mo. App. 72; Critten v. Chemical National Bank (1902) 171 N. Y. 219, 229,
63 N. E. 969, 972. Where the depositor knows or ought to know that an indorse-
ment is forged, his failure to give notice to the bank has the same effect as a
failure to give notice that his signature is forged. In the following cases it was'
expressly recognized that the drawee bank can sustain no injury where it pays
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That, if there is injury, it is not necessarily the amount of the forged
checks is obvious from the nature of things. When such is not the
extent of the injury, these courts' own reasons in classes one and two
show the injustice of giving the bank a complete defence and demon-
strate the justness of the result reached under the minority view, first
announced by the Supreme Court of Alabama, that the depositor is
under a duty in the strict sense. The application of this theory can
result in no injustice. The other theories inevitably work injustice
where the depositor has not actual notice of the forgeries and where the
ultimate loss to the bank would not be the amount of the forged checks
paid.
II
It is generally agreed that payment of forged checks, after the
depositor is charged with notice that similar checks have been paid, is
a defence pro tanto against the depositor's claim. 51 His silence,- under
such circumstances, is said to be a tacit representation that such former
checks were drawn by him, or by his authority, in the form in which
they were presented for payment. Of course the depositor makes no
representation in fact, because generally he does not know that such
checks exist. But, because such payments were reasonably made by
the bank, it is thought that its indebtedness should be to this extent
reduced, and the fiction of a representation is indulged in by the
courts in order to justify this result by the application of a well recog-
nized principle of law. If the depositor's silence as to former forged
checks is tantamount to an express representation that the circum-
stances under which those checks were drawn were such that it exer-
cised a power when it paid them, the same power should exist when
subsequent checks are presented which appear to have been likewise
drawn, and payment of such checks, without more, should decrease the
bank's indebtedness. One court, however among those that are so
ready to apply the doctrine of estoppel'to such part of the depositor's
claim as the bank claims to have extinguished by payment of the forged
checks in class one, has held that the depositor is not estopped unless
the bank shows special injury, e. g., that it has been induced to forbear
to take steps which it might otherwise have taken.52 Payment in
the check to a holder who is solvent. Harlem Coaperative Building & Loan
Association v. Mercantile Trust Co. (1895, C. P.) io Misc. 68o, 31 N. Y. Supp.
790; Critten v. Chemical National Bank, supra; National Bank of Commerce v.
Fish (1916, Okla.) x61 Pac. 11o5; Brixen v. Deseret National Bank (1888) 5
Utah, 504, 18 Pac. 43. Contra, Cunningham v. First'National Bank (1907) 219
Pa. 31o, 68 Atl. 731.
0 This is the view of those courts which follow First Nrational Bank of
Birminigham v. Allen, supra note 7, as well as of those which apply the doctrine of
estoppel to the first forged checks returned to the depositor, cited supra notes 4o
and 4.
Weinstein v. National Bank of Jefferson, supra note 50.
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reliance upon an express representation would be all that is required to
estop the depositor, and there is no reason to require more where the
bank acts upon an appearance created by the depositor's inaction.
But the depositor should not be estopped unless an appearance of
genuineness for which he is responsible misleads the bank when it pays.
In Hardy & Bros. v. Chesapeake Bank,5 3 the court said:
"If such facts [either actual or constructive knowledge of the forger-
ies] be found to exist, then it must also be found, in order to work an
estoppel, that the appellee acted, in honoring and paying the nine checks
in question, in reference to the conduct of the appellants in failing to
make known an objection to the account as stated and balanced in the
bankbook on the 13th of July, 1873, and that such omission and neglect
of the appellants did in fact mislead the appellee into the error of paying
the nine forged checks now in dispute."
This rule is difficult to apply. Whether the bank acted "in reference
to" the depositor's conduct or whether his neglect "did in fact mislead"
the bank is not always easy to determine. If a forged check is pre-
sented for payment, and the bank is unaware that checks like it have
been paid and returned, and it makes such investigation as satisfies it
that the check is genuine, the language quoted would seem to indicate
that the depositor would not be estopped because his tacit representa-
tion had not been relied upon; and this may be correct. If notice of
the previous forgeries had been given, however, the subsequent checks
would in all probability not have been presented, or the bank would have
been so much more on its guard that the forgery would have been dis-
covered. But in Walker v. Manchester & Liverpool District Banking
Co.,54 Mr. Justice Channell said:
"As regards the second and third checks, it is true that if Mr. Walker
had found out about the first check he would have got rid of the fraudu-
lent clerk, and the second and third forgeries would not have been com-
mitted. But the fact that Mr. Walker did not do so was not in law the
cause of the second and third cheques being forged. At most it was a
causa sine qua non, but that will not do."
If, when a forged check is presented, the bank makes no such investi-
gation and has no definite recollection that similar checks have been
paid and returned, the language above quoted would seem to indicate
that the depositor would not be estopped, as the bank could hardly act
"in reference to" and be "in fact" misled by it when, at the time of
payment, it did not know of such conduct. But if the depositor is
estopped only when payment is made with a definite recollection that
similar checks have been paid, returned, and are unrepudiated, there
would rarely be occasion to apply the doctrine. The. courts'probably
(I879) 51 Md. 562, 589.
(1t913, K. B.) 29 T. L. R. 492, 493.
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would not and ought not to restrict the application of the doctrine to
such narrow limits. In Israel v. State National Bank,55 where it was
held that the bank had no defence because of payment of forged checks
previous to the return of the statement of account, but otherwise as to
such checks subsequently paid, the court said:
"Upon the facts of the instant case, plaintiff did not exercise this due
diligence. He- failed to report to the bank the forgeries which had
revealed themselves to him by the return of his checks on November
2Ist. He cannot recover therefore the amounts which were subse-
quently paid. Had he made the report, the bank would have been put
on its guard."
This seems to be a better statement of the causal relation required
to exist between the depositor's conduct and the bank's payment and
would doubtless be more generally approved. If so, it would be
unnecessary, as seems to be required by the Maryland court, for the
bank, in order to make out a prima facie defence of estoppel, to intro-
duce evidence to prove any facts other than previous payment and
return of similar checks which had not been repudiated at the time when
the checks in question were paid. These facts in themselves would
tend to prove that the bank was not put "on its guard" and that payment
was the consequence.56 If the depositor repels this presumption by
showing, for example, that the bank made an independent investiga-
tion which caused it to pay, the bank should then have to introduce
enough other evidence to prove the facts alleged as a defence, namely,
that the depositor's inaction caused it to pay.
Attention has already been directed to Mr. Justice Harlan's dictum57
that the bank must show itself free from negligence in paying and the
suggestion ventured that payment in good faith is all that should be
required. This dictum, so frequently repeated by the courts, was
applied in at least one case where the question related to the paymfent
of checks after the depositor was charged with notice of the previous
forgeries, and attention was very insufficiently directed to the changed
appearance of genuineness which such checks had as a result of the
depositor's failure to repudiate the previous forgeries." If a check
should be paid by the bank when there is some slight doubt as to its
genuineness, it is clear that a similar check may be later paid with abso-
lute confidence that it is genuine, when the bank has reason to believe
(19o9) 124 La. 885, 887, 50 So. 783, 784.
' See Morgan v. United States Mortgage & Trust Co. (1913) 208 N. Y. 218,
ioi N. E. 871; First National Bank of Birmingham v. Allen (1893) ioo Ala. 476,
14 So. 335; Neal v. First National Bank (19Ol) 26 Ind. App. 503, 6o N. E. 164;
DeFeriet v. Bank of America (1871) 23 La. Ann. 310; National Bank of Com-
nerce a. Tacoma Mill Co. (1gIo) 182 Fed. i.
' See supra note 44.
'National Dredging Co. v. Farners' Bank (19o8, Del.) 6 Pen. 580, 69 Atl. 6o7.
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that the depositor knows that the first check was paid and would object
to it if it was not genuine.
There was also a very interesting application of this rule in Critten
v. Chemical National Bank,5 9 where a depositor sought to recover the
amount of twenty-four forged checks which had been charged to his
account. The bank was held not entitled to credit for the first two for-
geries" which were paid by it before the account was balanced and
returned nor for the sixth and subsequent checks; otherwise as to the
third, fourth, and fifth. The court said:
"The sixth in sequence of these forgeries was a check of June 2oth,
1898, for $12.49, altered to the sum of $112.49, with the name of the
payee erased and "Cash" written in place thereof. The teller of the
defendant, who paid the check and was a witness on its behalf, testified
that the check showed on its face that the word "Cash" had been
written in place of the payee's name over an erasure; that the number
of dollars was also written over an erasure; that he did not like the
appearance of the check and that it was in such a mutilated condition
when it was presented to him that, before paying it, he required Davis
to indorse upon the check a receipt for its amount. That the defendant
was grossly negligent in paying the check and has only itself to thank
for that loss is apparent. But the effect of that negligence did not
cease with the payment of the check. The referee might well have found
that, had payment of the check been refused or had Davis been required
to obtain the indorsement or guaranty of the plaintiffs as to its correct-
ness, the forgeries of Davis would have been exposed and their repeti-
tion would not have occurred. That Davis was able to successfully
continue from this time to his arrest a series of forgeries is as fairly
attributable to the folly of the bank in paying to a clerk a check of his
employers which had plainly been altered without making inquiry as
to the reason or authority for the alteration, as it was to any carelessness
of the plaintiffs in failing to detect the alteration when the checks were
returned to them from the bank."
To summarize in conclusion, the bank should have a defence against
the depositor's claim to the extent to which it has paid checks in class
II, because the payment of such checks has been induced by the deposi-
tor's silence. If he has actual knowledge that forged checks in class I
have been paid and charged to his account, the bank should likewise
have a defence because of such payment, unless the depositor promptly
repudiated them. This should be so whether the bank can recover from
the forger or not. Ratification seems the sounder basis for this con-
clusion, since the fair interpretation of silence under such circumstances
is that the depositor assents to the charge; and, if he does, it has been
seen that sound policy requires that the legal effect should be the same
as if he had actually ordered payment.60 The really difficult problem
' (1902) 17M N. Y. 219, 231, 63 N. E. 969, 973. See also National Dredging
Co. v. Farmers' Bank, supra note 58.
"0This also seems to be the proper ground upon which to support Annett v.
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relates to the remainder of the checks in class I, where the depositor
has no actual knowledge of the forgeries and where the extent of the
bank's ultimate injury, attributable to the depositor's neglect, is not the
same as the amount of the forged checks paid. In such a case, aside
from the injustice of the result, the objection that one cannot ratify
what he does not know of seems conclusive against the ratification
theory. But the depositor's failure to pursue the course of the reason-
'ably diligent business man, when it would have resulted in timely dis-
covery and repudiation of the forgeries to the bank's benefit, must be
condemned. The original loss, however, by universal consent, as
between the depositor and the bank, falls upon the latter and justice
requires that it remain there, unless it appears that it could have been
prevented by due diligence on the part of the depositor and unless it
also appears that his co-operation was indispensable. Because the
estoppel theory does not permit of the shifting to the depositor of loss
to such extent, as seems so clearly required by justice, it should be
rejected for the duty theory under which this result will in every case
be reached.
Chase National Bank (i921) 196 App. Div. 632, 188 N. Y. Supp. 7, where it was
held that the payee of a check could not recover of the drawee bank, when the
latter had paid the check on the former's forged indorsement and the payee had
delayed in notifying the drawee for sixty days after he knew his indorsement had
been forged, having endeavored in the meantime to collect from the forger.
